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Resentencing in the Shadow of Johnson v. United States
On June 26, 2015, the Supreme Court handed down
a decision many years in the making—Johnson v. United
States.1 Johnson held that the ‘‘residual clause’’ of the
Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) is unconstitutionally
vague. Although Johnson may have been overshadowed in
the final days of a monumental Supreme Court term, the
decision is a significant one that will have important con-
sequences for the criminal justice system. ACCA’s residual
clause imposed a severe 15-year mandatory minimum term
of imprisonment, and many federal prisoners qualify for
ACCA’s mandatory minimum.2 Johnson did away with
ACCA’s residual clause such that defendants will no longer
face the prospect of its harsh penalties.
But will Johnson have any significance for the prisoners
who have already been sentenced under ACCA’s residual
clause and whose convictions have become final? The
answer to this question turns on a set of doctrines and
statutes that govern federal courts’ authority in collateral or
post-conviction review proceedings—proceedings that
occur after a defendant’s conviction has become final.
The courts of appeals have begun to sort through these
issues, and at least one circuit split may have already
emerged.
Under the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act (AEDPA), a prisoner may file a second or successive
petition for post-conviction review if a court of appeals
certifies that the petition contains ‘‘a new rule of constitu-
tional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by
the Supreme Court.’’3 Although new rules of constitutional
law generally do not apply to convictions that have become
final, certain ‘‘retroactive’’ rules do, and prisoners can raise
claims that are based on retroactive rules in petition for
post-conviction review. To file a second or successive peti-
tion for post-conviction review, a prisoner must show that
the Supreme Court has made a rule retroactive (as opposed
to a court of appeals or district court doing so).
Less than two months after Johnson was decided, the
courts of appeals issued differing decisions on whether the
Supreme Court has made Johnson retroactive. The U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit said that it had;4
one week later, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit said that it had not.5
In this short piece, I’ll flag some questions that have
arisen as the courts of appeals have begun to assess who can
be resentenced in light of Johnson. First, who actually has
a Johnson claim? Johnson may affect only a small number of
federal prisoners—those who were convicted of the
predicate offense for the ACCA enhancement, and whose
prior convictions qualify as violent felonies only under
ACCA’s residual clause. Second, is Johnson retroactive? The
decision is at least retroactive for those prisoners who were
sentenced under ACCA’s residual clause. Third, has the
Supreme Court ‘‘made’’ Johnson retroactive such that
a court of appeals may certify a second or successive post-
conviction petition on that basis? Although it is not clear
that the Court has ‘‘made’’ Johnson retroactive, I will offer
some thoughts on how the Supreme Court, the Department
of Justice (DOJ), and the federal courts may nonetheless
allow prisoners with Johnson claims to be resentenced so
that they do not serve more than the statutory maximum for
their offense of conviction.
I. Who Has a Johnson Claim?
The Armed Career Criminal Act imposes a series of pen-
alties on defendants who are convicted of being a felon in
possession of a firearm. Title 18 § 922(g) makes it unlawful
for any person convicted of a felony—meaning a crime
punishable by more than one year imprisonment—to pos-
sess a firearm.6 Section 924(a) provides that defendants
convicted under § 922(g) shall be ‘‘imprisoned not more
than 10 years.’’7 But ACCA—§ 924(e)—imposes a 15-year
mandatory minimum sentence for defendants who are
convicted under § 922(g) and who have three or more
convictions for ‘‘violent felonies.’’8 And, prior to Johnson,
ACCA defined a violent felony to include ‘‘any crime . . .
that . . . otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious
potential risk of physical injury to another.’’ (This language
was referred to as the ‘‘residual clause.’’)
Johnson held that the residual clause was unconstitu-
tionally vague. Johnson reasoned: ‘‘[T]he indeterminacy of
the wide-ranging inquiry required by the residual clause
both denies fair notice to defendants and invites arbitrary
enforcement by judges.’’9
Johnson will apply to any case that is still on direct
appeal. ‘‘New’’ constitutional rules apply to all cases that
have not yet become final—meaning the prisoner has not
yet exhausted his direct appeal in the court of appeals, or the
Supreme Court has not yet denied a petition for certiorari
(or the time to file a petition for certiorari has not yet
expired).10 The courts of appeals have thus far uniformly
remanded cases for resentencing where the case is on
direct appeal and the defendant was sentenced under
ACCA’s residual clause.11 Courts have also remanded these
cases for resentencing where the defendant did not initially
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argue that ACCA’s residual clause was unconstitutionally
vague.12
However, Johnson does not affect prisoners who were
sentenced under other provisions of ACCA, and it is
unclear whether Johnson will affect prisoners who were
sentenced under an analogous provision of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines.
A. The Residual Clause Only
Johnson did not find all of ACCA unconstitutionally vague.
In addition to the residual clause, ACCA defines a violent
felony to include any crime that ‘‘has as an element the use,
attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against
the person of another,’’13 as well as any crime that ‘‘is
burglary, arson, extortion, [or] involves use of explosives.’’14
And Johnson was careful to say that the decision ‘‘does not
call into question application of . . . [ACCA] to the four
enumerated offenses, or the remainder of the Act’s defini-
tion of a violent felony.’’15
Defendants therefore can still be sentenced to ACCA’s
15-year mandatory minimum under either the enumerated-
offense clause or the element-of-force clause, and defen-
dants who are eligible for the 15-year mandatory minimum
under these provisions do not have a Johnson claim. The
courts of appeals have thus far affirmed sentences that were
imposed under ACCA where the prisoners’ prior convic-
tions qualify as violent felonies under ACCA’s enumerated-
offense or element-of-force clause.16
B. The Career Offender Guideline
Johnson also confined its ruling in other ways. Johnson
maintained that the decision did not call into question the
myriad laws that use terms like ‘‘substantial risk,’’ most of
which ‘‘require gauging the riskiness of conduct in which
an individual defendant engages on a particular occasion,’’
rather than the riskiness of a category of crimes.17
There is, however, at least one provision that is almost
entirely of a piece with ACCA’s residual clause—the career
offender Guideline of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines recommend sentenc-
ing ranges based on defendants’ conduct and characteris-
tics. Federal judges first calculate the sentencing range
recommended by the Guidelines, and then choose a sen-
tence to impose. Judges are not, however, required to
impose a sentence within the recommended guidelines
range.18
The career offender Guideline mirrors ACCA in both its
wording and its interpretation. Section 4B1.1 of the
Guidelines increases a defendant’s recommended sen-
tencing range if the defendant is a ‘‘career offender.’’19 The
Guideline defines a career offender as someone who,
among other things, has ‘‘at least two prior felony convic-
tions of . . . a crime of violence.’’20 And § 4B1.2 of the
Guidelines defines a ‘‘crime of violence’’ using precisely the
same language as ACCA’s residual clause: A ‘‘crime of
violence’’ includes any offense punishable by more than
one year that ‘‘involves conduct that presents a serious
potential risk of physical injury to another.’’21 Courts of
appeals have interpreted the career offender Guideline to
require the same ‘‘wide-ranging inquiry’’ the Supreme
Court had used to interpret ACCA’s residual clause (and
that it found unconstitutionally vague).22
Do prisoners sentenced under the career offender
Guideline have a Johnson claim?23 There are some argu-
ments for why Johnson might mean the residual clause of the
career offender Guideline is unconstitutionally vague. John-
son held that the language used in the career offender
Guideline’s residual clause—or at least how courts are
interpreting that language—is ‘‘indetermina[te]’’ and ‘‘both
denies fair notice to defendants and invites arbitrary
enforcement by judges.’’24 Applying the residual clause of
the career offender Guideline amounts to nothing more than
‘‘guesswork and intuition,’’25 and so it is strange to think that
a court could still impose a sentence that relied on the career
offender Guideline’s residual clause. That is all the more
true given the substantial role the Guidelines play in deter-
mining a defendant’s ultimate sentence. District courts must
first accurately calculate the Guidelines range,26 and the
district court’s failure to properly calculate the Guidelines
range is reversible error.27 And last year 46 percent of sen-
tences fell within the recommended Guidelines range.28
In part for these reasons, the Supreme Court recently
held that it was a violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause to
impose a sentence using Guidelines that were promulgated
after the defendant’s criminal acts where the new Guide-
lines provide for a higher Guidelines range.29 The Court
rejected the argument that the Guidelines’ advisory nature
meant there was no violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause.
The Court reasoned, ‘‘That a district court may ultimately
sentence a given defendant outside the Guidelines range
does not deprive the Guidelines of force as the framework
for sentencing.’’30 The Court thus concluded that ‘‘[a] ret-
rospective increase in the Guidelines range applicable to
a defendant creates a sufficient risk of a higher sentence to
constitute an ex post facto violation.’’31
It is not hard to imagine an opinion relying on this kind
of reasoning to find the Guidelines unconstitutionally
vague.32 A Guidelines range might ‘‘create[] a sufficient risk
of a’’ particular sentence such that Guidelines must provide
clear notice to defendants and ensure against arbitrary
enforcement by courts.33 And Johnson held that the way in
which courts interpret the residual clause of the career
offender Guideline amounts to nothing more than
‘‘guesswork and intuition.’’34 Thus, if the Guidelines are
amenable to vagueness challenges, the career offender
Guideline is probably unconstitutionally vague.
But in other contexts, the Guidelines’ advisory nature
insulates them from certain kinds of constitutional chal-
lenges. Consider the Court’s Sixth Amendment doctrine.
The Sixth Amendment requires juries to make findings on
any ‘‘element of the offense’’; if a fact constitutes an ele-
ment of the offense, that fact must be found by the jury.35
And any fact that establishes a defendant’s eligibility for
a mandatory minimum sentence is considered an element
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of the offense.36 But any fact that establishes a defendant’s
eligibility for a higher Guidelines range is not an element of
the offense.37 The reason for this is because the Guidelines
are recommendations: The Guidelines’ advisory nature
means they do not constitute elements of a criminal
offense—they are not the functional equivalent of manda-
tory statutes—for purposes of the Sixth Amendment.38
It is therefore also possible to imagine an opinion finding
that Johnson does not apply to the Guidelines on the ground
that the advisory Guidelines are not amenable to vagueness
challenges. Although Johnson decided that the language in
the career offender Guideline was unconstitutionally vague,
the Guidelines’ advisory nature may alter the due process
calculus. Defendants may not be constitutionally entitled to
fair notice of their recommended sentencing ranges.39 And
courts’ arbitrary enforcement of the advisory Guidelines may
not amount to a deprivation of due process: Whereas ACCA
requires courts to sentence defendants to more time, the
Guidelines merely recommend that they do so.40 Because
the Guidelines are advisory, in other words, they may not
qualify as the kinds of criminal laws that are subject to
vagueness challenges, just as they do not qualify as elements
of a criminal offense for purposes of the Sixth Amendment.
Indeed, for these reasons, one court of appeals held that ‘‘the
Guidelines are not susceptible to vagueness challenges.’’41
One other note: the sheer number of prisoners who are
sentenced under the career offender Guideline may be
a significant factor in how courts resolve whether Johnson
requires invalidating the career offender Guideline. Many
more defendants are subjected each year to the career
offender Guideline than to ACCA—approximately 2,000
offenders each year receive the career offender Guideline
enhancement, whereas only 600 offenders each year are
sentenced under ACCA.42 And a ruling that the career
offender Guideline is unconstitutionally vague may require
courts to determine, in every case that has not yet become
final, whether every defendant who was sentenced under
the career offender Guideline was sentenced under the
residual clause.43
As of this writing, no court of appeals has decided
whether Johnson means the career offender Guideline is
unconstitutionally vague.44 It may be that they never have to
do so—as Stephen Sady and Gillian Schroff note, the gov-
ernment has conceded in several cases that Johnson applies
to the advisory career offender Guideline.45 Some courts of
appeals have remanded cases so that district courts may
consider, in the first instance, whether prisoners sentenced
under the career offender Guideline have a Johnson claim.46
As these courts recognized, after Johnson, the Supreme
Court vacated sentences of prisoners who were sentenced
under the residual clause of the Sentencing Guidelines.47
But vacatur isn’t a sign of the Court’s views on the merits,48
and in all of the post-Johnson vacaturs, Justice Alito con-
curred to note that ‘‘[o]n remand, the Court of Appeals
should understand that the Court’s disposition of this
petition does not reflect any view regarding petitioner’s
entitlement to relief.’’49
II. Are Johnson Claims Retroactive?
Assuming a prisoner has a Johnson claim—which I take
here to mean the prisoner was sentenced under ACCA’s
residual clause—will that be of any use for a prisoner who
has already been sentenced under ACCA’s residual clause?
I’ll keep my remarks on Johnson’s retroactivity brief in light
of what has already been written on this issue.50
The short story is that ‘‘new’’ constitutional rules gen-
erally do not apply to criminal cases that have already
become final.51 However, new constitutional rules are ret-
roactive—meaning the new rules apply to convictions that
have already become final—if the new rule is ‘‘substantive,’’
or if it is a ‘‘watershed’’ rule of criminal procedure.52
The Supreme Court has said that one example of
a ‘‘substantive’’ rule is a ‘‘decision[] that narrow[s] the scope
of a criminal statute by interpreting its terms.’’53 A decision
that ‘‘modifies the elements of an offense is normally sub-
stantive rather than procedural.’’54 Substantive rules create
‘‘‘a significant risk that a defendant stands convicted of an
act that the law does not make criminal’ or faces a punish-
ment that the law cannot impose upon him.’’55
Johnson falls squarely in this category of substantive
rules. Johnson ‘‘modifie[d] the elements of an offense’’ by
altering what facts establish a defendant’s eligibility for
a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment.56 The
Supreme Court has said in no uncertain terms that ‘‘any
fact that increases the mandatory minimum’’ sentence is an
‘‘element’’ of an offense: ‘‘[A] fact triggering a mandatory
minimum . . . constitute[s] a new, aggravated crime.’’57 By
changing who is eligible for a mandatory minimum sen-
tence, Johnson modified the elements of a criminal offense.
The decision also altered what punishment defendants
convicted under § 922(g) could receive. Without the ACCA
enhancement, the statutory maximum term of imprison-
ment for a conviction under § 922(g) is ten years, whereas
with the enhancement, the statutory mandatory minimum
term of imprisonment is fifteen years. Johnson therefore
means that defendants sentenced under ACCA’s residual
clause received ‘‘a punishment the law c[ould] not impose
on’’ them—a term of years exceeding the statutory maxi-
mum for their offense of conviction.58
The courts of appeals cases also point in this direction.
Prior to Johnson, the courts of appeals were unanimous in
saying that Supreme Court decisions interpreting ACCA’s
scope were substantive and therefore retroactive.59 It is
hard to see how a decision ‘‘interpreting’’ ACCA’s scope
would be substantive, but a decision invalidating ACCA’s
residual clause—which also alters ACCA’s scope—would
not be. Both kinds of decisions modify the elements of an
offense and alter a defendant’s eligibility for a 15-year term
of imprisonment.
III. Second or Successive Petitions: In re Rivero and Price
The story is a bit more complicated, however, for defen-
dants who have already filed one petition for post-
conviction review. Under AEDPA, a prisoner must obtain
permission from a three-judge panel on the court of appeals
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before filing a second or successive petition for post-
conviction review. The statute permits a second or succes-
sive petition to proceed if the petition contains ‘‘a new rule
of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral
review by the Supreme Court, that was previously
unavailable.’’60
In this final Part, I’ll offer some thoughts on whether the
Supreme Court has ‘‘made’’ Johnson retroactive. In Tyler
v. Cain, the Supreme Court created a very high threshold
for establishing that the Court has ‘‘made’’ a decision ret-
roactive: The Court can only ‘‘make’’ a decision retroactive
through holdings in particular cases. And in light of Tyler,
it’s not clear that the Court has ‘‘made’’ Johnson retroactive
for purposes of AEDPA.
I’ll also analyze the two court of appeals opinions—the
Seventh Circuit in Price and the Eleventh Circuit in Rivero—
that have thus far grappled with whether the Supreme
Court has ‘‘made’’ Johnson retroactive. Rivero is a bit quirky
because the defendant in that case wasn’t actually sen-
tenced under ACCA—he was sentenced under the career
offender Guideline. The defendant therefore may not have
had a Johnson claim at all. Rivero should be understood in
this light—that is, as saying that the Supreme Court has
not made Johnson retroactive only as to those defendants
who were sentenced under the career offender Guideline.
Price allowed the second or successive post-conviction
petition to proceed on the theory that the Supreme Court
has made Johnson retroactive. I’m sympathetic to allowing
prisoners with Johnson claims to be resentenced—both
because the decision is retroactive and because prisoners
with Johnson claims have received sentences that are five
years longer than the statutory maximum for their offense
of conviction. But it’s not clear that these petitions satisfy
§ 2255(h)(2)’s requirements for second or successive
petitions, or at least how the Court has interpreted these
requirements.
I’ll therefore offer some thoughts on how prisoners with
Johnson claims can be resentenced even if Johnson claims do
not satisfy § 2255(h)(2)’s preconditions for second or suc-
cessive petitions. There are things the Supreme Court,
DOJ, and the federal courts can do by way of providing
remedies to prisoners who have received unconstitutional
sentences under Johnson.
A. Has Johnson Been ‘‘Made Retroactive . . . by the
Supreme Court’’?
1. Background. Whether the Supreme Court has ‘‘made’’
Johnson retroactive turns on how you read the Court’s
decision in Tyler v. Cain.61 Tyler interpreted a provision of
§ 2244 that governs federal courts’ ability to grant second
or successive post-conviction petitions for prisoners who
were convicted in state court.62 This provision, however, is
virtually the same as the one applicable to federal prison-
ers under § 2255. Section 2244 reads: ‘‘A claim presented
in a second or successive habeas corpus application . . .
shall be dismissed unless . . . the applicant shows that the
claim relies on a new rule of constitutional law, made
retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme
Court.’’63
Tyler said that the Court can ‘‘make’’ a rule retroactive
only through ‘‘holdings’’ rather than dicta.64 And Tyler
determined that the Supreme Court had not made Cage v.
Louisiana retroactive. (Cage held that a jury instruction is
unconstitutional if the instruction creates a reasonable
likelihood that a jury would think it could convict a defen-
dant without proof beyond a reasonable doubt.65)
Tyler reasoned that the Court had not made Cage retro-
active because ‘‘Cage itself does not hold that it is retroac-
tive. The only holding in Cage is that the particular jury
instruction violated the Due Process Clause.’’66 Tyler then
rejected the argument that ‘‘the reasoning in Sullivan
[v. Louisiana] makes clear that retroactive application [of
Cage] is warranted by the principles announced in Teague v.
Lane.’’67 (Teague held that new rules do not apply retroac-
tively unless they are substantive rules or watershed rules of
criminal procedure.68) Sullivan had held that a Cage error
always requires invalidating a conviction on direct review
(in other words, that a Cage error is a structural error).69
Sullivan held that Cage errors always require a conviction to
be reversed because Cage errors ‘‘undermine[] the reliability
of a trial’s outcome’’ and ‘‘deprive a defendant of a bedrock
element of a procedural fairness.’’70 The defendant in Tyler
argued that Sullivan’s reasoning also established that Cage
qualified as a ‘‘watershed’’ rule of criminal procedure under
Teague such that the Court had made Cage retroactive.71
Tyler rejected this argument: ‘‘The most [the defendant] can
claim is that, based on the principles outlined in Teague,
this Court should make Cage retroactive. . . . What is clear,
however, is that we have not ‘made’ Cage retroactive.’’72
Tyler came pretty close to suggesting that the Supreme
Court can ‘‘make’’ a rule retroactive only by issuing a deci-
sion holding that rule retroactive or applying that rule to
a case on collateral review. But Tyler acknowledged that
‘‘with the right combination of holdings’’ the Court could
‘‘make a rule retroactive.’’73 That would be the case, Tyler
maintained, only where ‘‘the holdings in those cases nec-
essarily dictate retroactivity of the new rule.’’74 And Tyler
explained that Sullivan and Teague had not made Cage ret-
roactive because ‘‘[t]he holding in Sullivan is that a Cage
error is [a] structural error. There is no second case that
held all structural-error rules apply retroactively.’’75
To me, the argument that the Court has ‘‘made’’ Johnson
retroactive looks, in some respects, like the failed argument
in Tyler for why the Court had ‘‘made’’ Cage retroactive. In
Schriro v. Summerlin, the Supreme Court said that ‘‘sub-
stantive’’ rules include ‘‘decisions that narrow the scope of
a criminal statute’’ or decisions that create ‘‘a significant
risk that a defendant . . . faces a punishment that the law
cannot impose on him.’’76 But the ‘‘holding’’ in Schriro was
that Ring v. Arizona was not retroactive because it was nei-
ther a substantive rule nor a watershed rule of criminal
procedure. Schriro’s statements about what would consti-
tute substantive rules therefore might not qualify as
holdings.
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Bousley v. United States comes closer to making—that is,
holding—Johnson retroactive.77 Bousley held that a decision
interpreting what it means to ‘‘use’’ firearms during a drug
trafficking offense—in violation of § 924(c)—applied ret-
roactively because the rule announced by the decision was
substantive. Bousley explained that Teague did not prohibit
the retroactive application of decisions where ‘‘this Court
decides the meaning of a criminal statute enacted by Con-
gress.’’78 That fairly describes what the Court did in John-
son—it decided the meaning of a criminal statute (ACCA).
But Bousley did not ‘‘hold’’ a rule establishing a defendant’s
eligibility for a mandatory minimum sentence to be retro-
active. The rule that Bousley held retroactive was a decision
about what conduct the law proscribes—what ‘‘uses’’ of
a firearm were prohibited by § 924(c).
This doesn’t mean that Johnson is not retroactive; I think
it clearly is. But I’m not sure that some of the reasons why
Johnson is retroactive—the statements in Schriro; the una-
nimity among the courts of appeals that Supreme Court
decisions interpreting ACCA are retroactive; and the
Court’s Sixth Amendment cases—are ‘‘holdings’’ of the
Supreme Court that ‘‘necessarily dictate’’ Johnson’s retro-
activity. For example, ‘‘[t]he holding of [Alleyne v. United
States] is that’’ a fact establishing a defendant’s eligibility for
a mandatory minimum sentence is an element of the
offense.79 But it’s not clear that there is a second decision
holding that all rules interpreting the elements of a criminal
offense are retroactive.80 Bousley is the most natural can-
didate for such a decision, and it certainly helps that Schriro
construed Bousley to say that all ‘‘decisions that narrow the
scope of a criminal statute’’ are substantive.81 But it’s not
clear whether the ‘‘holding’’ of Bousley is that all decisions
altering the meaning of a criminal statute are substantive,
or whether the ‘‘holding’’ of Bousley is that all decisions
interpreting what conduct the law proscribes are substan-
tive. There is language in the decision to support either
reading.82
2. Courts of Appeals. In Price, the Seventh Circuit con-
cluded that the Supreme Court had ‘‘made’’ Johnson retro-
active through its decisions announcing that substantive
rules apply retroactively.83 But the only decisions the Sev-
enth Circuit could point to were Schriro and Bousley. The
statements in these cases might suggest Johnson is retro-
active, and I think that the better reading of these cases is
that Johnson is retroactive. But it’s less clear whether the
‘‘holdings’’ in these cases ‘‘dictate’’ that Johnson is
retroactive.
On the other side, the Eleventh Circuit’s explanation in
Rivero for why the Supreme Court had not ‘‘made’’ Johnson
retroactive was slightly puzzling. Before diving into
whether the Supreme Court had ‘‘made’’ Johnson retroac-
tive, the Eleventh Circuit stated that ‘‘the new rule
announced in Johnson is substantive rather than procedural
because it narrowed the scope of section 924(e) by inter-
preting its terms, specifically, the term violent felony.’’84
But in explaining why the Supreme Court had not ‘‘made’’
Johnson retroactive, the Eleventh Circuit maintained that
‘‘the rule announced in Johnson does not meet the criteria
the Supreme Court uses to determine whether the retro-
activity exception for new substantive rules applies.’’85 I’m
not sure how a new rule can be ‘‘substantive’’—as the
Eleventh Circuit held Johnson was—but at the same time
not satisfy ‘‘the retroactivity exception for new substantive
rules.’’ These are two sides of the same coin: A rule is
retroactively applicable in post-conviction proceedings if it’s
substantive—that is the retroactivity exception for new
substantive rules. I don’t think there is any conceptual
space between a rule being retroactive because it is sub-
stantive and a rule satisfying the retroactivity exception for
substantive rules.86
B. An Unnecessary (and Nonexistent?) Circuit Split?
The Seventh and Eleventh Circuits thus seem to have come
to different conclusions on whether the Supreme Court has
‘‘made’’ Johnson retroactive. But that circuit split was
potentially unnecessary—because the prisoner in Rivero
may not have had a Johnson claim at all—and may also be
potentially nonexistent—because Price and Rivero deter-
mined whether the Supreme Court has ‘‘made’’ Johnson
retroactive regarding two different kinds of prisoners.
1. Potentially Unnecessary. The prisoner in Rivero was
sentenced under the career offender Guideline rather than
ACCA. Rivero was convicted of conspiring to possess with
intent to distribute cocaine and using a firearm in further-
ance of a drug trafficking offense. (He was also originally
convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm—the
predicate offense for ACCA’s mandatory minimum—but
the Eleventh Circuit had previously vacated his § 922(g)
conviction.87) Based on Rivero’s prior convictions, the dis-
trict court sentenced him using the career offender
Guideline (in particular, using the ‘‘serious potential risk’’
provision of the career offender Guideline).88 Because
Rivero was sentenced under the career offender Guideline,
it might be the case that Rivero simply didn’t have a Johnson
claim at all.
But the facts of Rivero are more complicated than the
ordinary case where a prisoner was sentenced under the
advisory career offender Guideline. The Guidelines haven’t
always been advisory, and they weren’t advisory when the
district court sentenced Rivero. Before the Supreme Court’s
decision in United States v. Booker, the Guidelines were
‘‘mandatory’’—courts were required to impose sentences
within the Guidelines range, and Rivero was sentenced
when the Guidelines were mandatory.89 This makes Rivero
look a lot more like the prisoners who were sentenced
under ACCA than prisoners who were sentenced under the
advisory Guidelines. But there are still differences between
mandatory Guidelines and ACCA. For example, even when
the Guidelines were mandatory, the Guidelines authorized
courts to reduce a defendant’s recommended sentencing
range if the court determined the defendant’s criminal
history ‘‘substantially over-represent[ed] the seriousness of
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the defendant’s criminal history or the likelihood that the
defendant will commit other crimes.’’90 That is, courts
could depart from the career offender Guideline’s ‘‘man-
datory’’ sentencing range, but they can’t do the same with
respect to ACCA’s mandatory minimum. (As a further
aside, the Eleventh Circuit, on appeal, rejected Rivero’s
argument that the district court erred by not departing
downward from the Guidelines range under this provision.
The court also affirmed Rivero’s conviction and sentence
after Booker was decided, but didn’t remand for resenten-
cing in light of Booker.91)
Rather than deciding whether Rivero had a Johnson
claim, the Eleventh Circuit (or at least the majority opinion)
merely noted the defendant was sentenced under the
mandatory Sentencing Guidelines and ‘‘assume[d]
that . . . Johnson applies to the residual clause of section
4B1.2(a)(2) of the Sentencing Guidelines.’’92
2. Potentially Nonexistent. Working off that assumption,
the Eleventh Circuit chose to decide another question: Is
Johnson a new rule that has been ‘‘made retroactive to cases
on collateral review by the Supreme Court’’?93 Although the
Eleventh Circuit decided the case on these grounds, it’s not
clear there is a sharp split between the Eleventh and the
Seventh Circuits on this question or any other one.
For example, Rivero said that Johnson did not fall within
the retroactivity exception for new substantive rules. 94 But
I don’t think there is a real disagreement between Price and
Rivero on whether Johnson is retroactive. Rivero maintained
that ‘‘the new rule announced in Johnson is substantive
rather than procedural because it narrowed the scope of
section 924(e) by interpreting its terms, specifically, the
term violent felony.’’95 While Rivero later said that Johnson
did not fall within the retroactivity exception for new sub-
stantive rules, it said this in the course of explaining why
the Supreme Court had not ‘‘made’’ Johnson retroactive for
purposes of § 2255(h)(2)—that is, for reasons that apply only
to second or successive petitions for post-conviction review.
It’s also not entirely clear that Rivero decided the same
question that Price decided—namely, whether the
Supreme Court has ‘‘made’’ Johnson retroactive for
defendants who were sentenced under ACCA’s residual
clause. There’s a pretty good argument that Rivero held
only that the Supreme Court has not made Johnson retro-
active for defendants sentenced under the career offender
Guideline. The Eleventh Circuit reasoned that the dis-
sent’s ‘‘assumption’’—which the majority also made—
that ‘‘Johnson . . . applies to the residual clause of the career
offender’’ Guideline ‘‘makes clear that precedents of the
Supreme Court do not necessarily dictate’’ that Johnson is
retroactive.96 The Supreme Court could not have made
Johnson retroactive to Rivero’s case, the Eleventh Circuit
reasoned, because ‘‘[t]he Supreme Court has never held
that the Sentencing Guidelines are subject to a vagueness
challenge. And four of our sister circuits have held that the
Sentencing Guidelines—whether mandatory or advi-
sory—cannot be unconstitutionally vague.’’97 In other
words, the Supreme Court had not ‘‘made’’ Johnson retro-
active to cases involving the career offender Guidelines
because the Court has never addressed a vagueness chal-
lenge to the Guidelines. (Of course, the Eleventh Circuit’s
reasoning for why the Supreme Court has not made Johnson
retroactive—which assumes that Guidelines aren’t amena-
ble to vagueness challenges—is in tension with its threshold
assumption that Johnson applies to the Guidelines.)
This is a pretty limited reading of Rivero, and it’s prob-
ably informed by my view that Johnson is retroactive
(because it satisfies the retroactivity exception for substan-
tive rules). It’s also probably driven by my opinion that the
Eleventh Circuit shouldn’t have decided questions about
Johnson’s retroactivity without first addressing whether it
was even necessary to do so—that is, without first deciding
whether Johnson even applied to defendants sentenced
under the career offender Guideline. That is all the more
true given that the Eleventh Circuit seemed to be of the view
that it is an easy call that Johnson does not apply to the career
offender Guideline: the court noted that the Supreme Court
has never entertained a vagueness challenge to the Guide-
lines, and that four courts of appeals have held that
Guidelines, even mandatory ones, could never be uncon-
stitutionally vague.98 But because the Eleventh Circuit
didn’t address whether Johnson applies to the career
offender Guideline, we’re left with a potentially unneces-
sary circuit split and some uncertainty about who, exactly,
the Eleventh Circuit has said cannot be resentenced in light
of Johnson.99
C. Recommendations
Even if Johnson claims do not satisfy § 2255(h)(2)’s precon-
ditions for second or successive petitions, there are things
the Supreme Court, DOJ, and the federal courts can do to
ensure that prisoners who have received unconstitutional
sentences under Johnson can be resentenced.
1. Supreme Court. AEDPA limits the Supreme Court’s
ability to review courts of appeals’ decisions to grant or deny
authorization to file second or successive petitions for post-
conviction review. The Court could, however, weigh in on
whether such petitions should be allowed by granting
review in a case involving a first petition for post-conviction
review.
Even if there were a clear split between the Seventh and
the Eleventh Circuits on whether the Supreme Court has
‘‘made’’ Johnson retroactive, the Court is unlikely to review
either of the two cases. AEDPA greatly circumscribes the
Supreme Court’s ability to review courts of appeals’ deter-
minations regarding second or successive post-conviction
petitions. Under § 2244(b)(3)(E), ‘‘the grant or denial of an
authorization by a court of appeals to file a second or suc-
cessive application shall not be appealable and shall not be
the subject of a petition for rehearing or for a writ of cer-
tiorari.’’100 In Felker v. Turpin, the Supreme Court upheld
this provision against a constitutional challenge, noting that
§ 2244 did not repeal the Court’s jurisdiction to entertain
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‘‘original’’ petitions for habeas corpus—petitions that are
filed directly in the Supreme Court (under § 2241).101 An
‘‘original’’ petition in Rivero would make the same argu-
ment that was made in the court of appeals, but the Court
wouldn’t technically be reviewing the judgment of the court
of appeals.
But ‘‘original’’ habeas petitions aren’t a full substitute
for petitions for certiorari—they are very rarely granted.
Felker didn’t decide whether the statutory limitations on
courts of appeals’ (and district courts’) authority to grant
habeas petitions also apply to the Supreme Court’s
authority to grant original habeas petitions under § 2241.102
But Felker did note that, under the Supreme Court’s own
rules, original petitions are rarely granted—they are
granted only in ‘‘exceptional circumstances.’’103 It’s not
clear what those exceptional circumstances would be, but
getting the Court to hear an original petition in Rivero may
be an insurmountable barrier.
So what should the Supreme Court do? I think there are
good reasons to dispense with the Court’s usual rules for
granting certiorari so that it can say whether Johnson is
retroactive. Doing so may, in effect, be the only way it can
speak to the question whether it has ‘‘made’’ Johnson
retroactive.
Typically, the Court will wait for a circuit split to emerge
before deciding to take up an issue. However, it seems
somewhat unlikely that a circuit split will emerge on
whether Johnson is retroactive (at least regarding prisoners
who were sentenced under ACCA’s residual clause). Before
Johnson, five circuits had already held that Supreme Court
decisions narrowing ACCA’s scope apply retroactively.104
The two circuits that have weighed in after Johnson have
determined that the decision applies retroactively.105 And
for reasons I explained, I also think the case law largely
points in one direction—toward retroactivity.
The question on which a circuit split is more likely to
arise is whether the Supreme Court has ‘‘made’’ Johnson
retroactive, but it is on that question that the Supreme
Court is least able to weigh in. The Court can’t review by
way of a petition for certiorari the courts of appeals’ deci-
sions to grant or deny authorizations to file a second or
successive post-conviction petition.106 And any ‘‘original’’
habeas petition the Court agreed to hear under § 2241
wouldn’t require the Court to decide whether it has ‘‘made’’
Johnson retroactive because § 2255(h)’s requirements on
second or successive petitions do not apply with equal force
to original petitions filed under § 2241.107
There is one way the Court could review a court of
appeals’ determination on whether the Court has made
Johnson retroactive. It could grant review in a case where the
district court and court of appeals heard a second or suc-
cessive post-conviction petition on the merits after the court
of appeals authorized the filing of a second or successive
petition.108 But the sheer length of time it would take these
petitions to reach the Court would mean that even a deci-
sion saying that the Court has made Johnson retroactive
might not provide meaningful relief for some defendants
who were sentenced under ACCA’s residual clause.
A prisoner who is filing a second or successive petition for
post-conviction review has already spent some number of
years in prison—it takes, on average, about a year and a half
for a prisoner’s conviction to become final.109 A prisoner
then has one year to file a petition for post-conviction
review.110 District courts take, on average, 8 to 12 months to
adjudicate post-conviction petitions;111 a prisoner must
receive a certificate of appealability from a judge on the
court of appeals before proceeding with an appeal;112 if the
appeal proceeds, the courts of appeals take, on average,
a year to decide a case once a notice of appeal has been
filed.113 And once the proceedings in the court of appeals
have finished, defendants have ninety days after the court of
appeals’ entry of judgment to file a petition for certiorari.114
That process starts all over again for a second or successive
petition: The prisoner first seeks authorization to file the
petition in the court of appeals, which has 90 days to dis-
pose of a request to file a second or successive petition;115
the district court will take 8 to 12 months to adjudicate
a post-conviction petition; and the court of appeals will take
a year to decide a case once a notice of appeal has been filed.
By the time the Supreme Court hears an appeal from
a second or successive petition that has been adjudicated on
the merits, the prisoner may already be close to serving ten
years in prison, which is the statutory maximum term of
imprisonment for a defendant convicted under § 922(g)
(who does not qualify for the ACCA enhancement).
Therefore, the way for the Supreme Court to weigh in
on whether it has ‘‘made’’ Johnson retroactive—and to do so
in time to ensure that defendants do not serve a longer term
of imprisonment than the statutory maximum for their
offense of conviction—may be for the Court to grant review
in a case involving a first petition for post-conviction review.
It is unlikely that these cases would qualify under one tra-
ditional criterion for certiorari—the existence of a circuit
split—but AEDPA’s restrictions on the Court’s ability to
review courts of appeals’ determinations on whether to
allow such petitions to proceed may be a reason why cer-
tiorari would be warranted anyway.
2. DOJ (& Congress?). AEDPA and Tyler v. Cain create a real
predicament for prisoners with Johnson claims: Even
though Johnson is, in my view, clearly retroactive, the
Supreme Court must make the decision retroactive before
a second or successive post-conviction petition raising
a Johnson claim may proceed. And after Tyler, it is hard to
show that the Supreme Court has ‘‘made’’ a rule retroactive.
One solution for DOJ to consider is simply to waive the
argument that the Supreme Court has not made Johnson
retroactive. Litigants don’t have to make every argument on
which they might prevail, and the government could agree
to waive procedural barriers to resentencing—including
that the Supreme Court have ‘‘made’’ a rule retroactive—in
order to allow prisoners with Johnson claims to be resen-
tenced. The government has waived resentencing argu-
ments in the past: It has conceded that decisions
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interpreting ACCA are retroactive;116 it has conceded that
Johnson applies to the career offender Guideline;117 and it
has conceded that prisoners may bring a post-conviction
petition under § 2241 to correct the mistaken imposition of
an ACCA sentence.118 And the government could issue
a blanket public policy waiving the argument that the
Supreme Court has not ‘‘made’’ Johnson retroactive so that
prisoners may bring second or successive post-conviction
petitions based on Johnson. Courts do not generally take up
arguments that litigants have voluntarily and deliberately
waived unless an argument goes to the courts’ jurisdic-
tion.119 For reasons I’ll explain in a future article, I do not
think that the preconditions for issuing a certificate of
appealability under § 2255(h) are jurisdictional; only the
actual issuance of a certificate of appealability is.120
Besides allowing defendants with Johnson claims to be
resentenced in time, waiving the argument that the
Supreme Court has not ‘‘made’’ Johnson retroactive has
other salutary benefits as well. Section 2255(h)(2) puts
courts of appeals in the difficult position of saying both that
a decision such as Johnson is retroactive under current
doctrine, and that the Supreme Court’s decisions do not
logically dictate that conclusion. Courts decide cases—
especially retroactivity ones—by looking to the Supreme
Court’s cases, so what court wants to admit that its con-
clusion doesn’t follow, or at least isn’t compelled by, pre-
cedent? Saying that the Supreme Court’s cases are even
slightly ambiguous opens up the court of appeals’ retroac-
tivity determination to question.
Finally, the procedure for filing a second or successive
petition is another example of the shortcomings with our
system of post-conviction review. Much of the criticism of
post-conviction review has focused on federal post-
conviction review of state criminal convictions.121 But
§ 2255(h)(2) is a restriction that applies to both federal and
state criminal convictions. It is also a restriction that has
little to recommend it. It forecloses meritorious claims. The
claims it forecloses may be especially significant ones;
§ 2255(h)(2) may foreclose claims that are retroactive either
because they are ‘‘substantive’’ (meaning there is ‘‘‘a sig-
nificant risk that a defendant stands convicted of an act that
the law does not make criminal’ or faces a punishment that
the law cannot impose upon him’’122) or because they are
‘‘watershed rules of criminal procedure’’ (meaning the
claims implicate ‘‘the fundamental fairness and accuracy of
the criminal proceeding’’ and are ‘‘implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty’’123). The provision puts courts of appeals in
the awkward position of saying precedent indicates but
does not compel a rule’s retroactivity. And it creates a dra-
conian precondition for second or successive petitions:
Given how few cases the Supreme Court hears each term, it
is unlikely that the Court will ‘‘hold’’ all rules retroactive
that should be retroactive, or that fairly are retroactive under
the Court’s precedents.
3. Federal Courts. There are also a few things federal courts
may consider as they are reviewing resentencing claims.
Prisoners have no general right to counsel in post-
conviction proceedings.124 Under the current rules gov-
erning appointment of counsel, courts ‘‘may’’ appoint
counsel if ‘‘the interests of justice so require’’ where
a prisoner is seeking relief under § 2255.125 There are good
reasons to appoint counsel in any post-conviction proceed-
ing where a prisoner has even a colorable Johnson claim. For
one thing, it is unlikely that many prisoners seeking
resentencing in light of Johnson will have made the Johnson
argument—that ACCA’s residual clause is unconstitution-
ally vague—before. Circuit precedent foreclosed that argu-
ment in almost every court of appeals.126 Prisoners
therefore ‘‘cannot rely on a court opinion or the prior work
of an attorney addressing that claim’’127 when preparing
their post-conviction petitions. Moreover, whether
a Johnson claim will succeed depends on arguments—such
as retroactivity, plain error, procedural default, and statu-
tory restrictions on post-conviction review—that also would
not have been developed by a prior court opinion or the
prior work of an attorney. These rules are also complicated,
and a prisoner ‘‘unlearned in the law, may not comply with
the [] procedural rules or may misapprehend the substan-
tive details’’ of the law.128 Additionally, determining who
has a colorable Johnson claim—which may involve deter-
mining whether the career offender Guideline is uncon-
stitutionally vague and whether prisoners’ prior convictions
qualify as violent felonies under other ACCA provisions—is
just plain hard. Prisoners and courts may therefore benefit
from having briefing prepared by counsel.
Courts may also consider whether there is another ave-
nue to relief—besides § 2255(h)(2)—for prisoners with
Johnson claims who have already filed one petition for post-
conviction review. Section 2241 authorizes federal courts to
grant writs of habeas corpus, and § 2241 does not contain
any of the limitations applicable to petitions for review
under § 2255. However, there are limits on when prisoners
may use § 2241 to evade § 2255’s limitations: Section 2255(e)
(the ‘‘savings clause’’) permits prisoners to utilize § 2241
only where ‘‘the remedy [provided by § 2255] is inadequate
or ineffective to test the legality of [the prisoner’s]
detention.’’
Section 2255(e)’s savings clause may allow prisoners
sentenced under ACCA who have already filed one petition
for post-conviction review to obtain relief under § 2241.
Section 2255’s limitations on second or successive petitions
mean that defendants sentenced under ACCA will linger in
prison—possibly for a term of imprisonment that exceeds
the statutory maximum for their offense—because they
must wait to file a petition for post-conviction review until
the Supreme Court makes Johnson retroactive. That makes
the § 2255 remedy nonexistent—and thus inadequate or
ineffective—to test the legality of these prisoners’
detentions.129
However narrow the savings clause may be, it probably
should, at a minimum, allow defendants to obtain relief
where they were subjected to an unconstitutionally vague
mandatory sentencing enhancement that resulted in




 http://online.ucpress.edu/fsr/article-pdf/28/1/45/93338/fsr_2015_28_1_45.pdf by U
niversity of M
ichigan user on 20 August 2021
a sentence that exceeds the statutory maximum for their
offense of conviction. Some cases have gestured in this
direction. Moore v. Warden, FCC Coleman-Medium held that
§ 2255’s limitations on second or successive petitions made
the § 2255 remedy inadequate for a defendant who was
mistakenly subjected to the ACCA enhancement in light of
subsequent precedent.130 And in several cases ‘‘the gov-
ernment concede[d] that a claim that a sentencing error
result[ing] in a sentence longer than the statutory maximum
may be brought in an initial § 2255 motion or, if that remedy
is foreclosed by § 2255(h), in a § 2241 petition by virtue of the
savings clause.’’131 Even cases finding the savings clause
inapplicable—thus preventing recourse to § 2241—note that
the savings clause permits litigants to sidestep § 2255(h)’s
limitations on second or successive petitions ‘‘[w]hen
a change of law, retroactively applicable, shows that a pris-
oner . . . has received an illegally high sentence.’’132 This
would be the case for defendants convicted under § 922(g)
and sentenced under ACCA: Without the ACCA enhance-
ment, the statutory maximum term of imprisonment for a §
922(g) conviction is ten years, but ACCA requires a mini-
mum term of fifteen years’ imprisonment.
* * *
Whether Johnson has any significance for prisoners who
have already been sentenced under ACCA’s residual clause
will be determined in part by whether courts find the
decision retroactive, and whether courts allow prisoners to
raise Johnson claims in second or successive post-conviction
petitions. But part of Johnson’s significance may be that the
decision will lead courts to make determinations about
what kinds of constitutional rules are retroactive, and to
interpret several little known but important provisions of
AEDPA.133 These rules—retroactivity doctrine and
AEDPA—are the gatekeeping mechanisms that dictate, in
case after case, whether prisoners have any remedies for
constitutional violations. Johnson provides an occasion to
understand these rules and their limitations.
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